anthony js

Saturday, August 06, 2005

Fill the gap and breed

It's interesting to see a new advertising campaign has been launched for Brisbane. I heard on the news that the primary objective of the campaign is to shake off Brisbane's 'big country town' reputation. The television ad, after it has thrown at us images of perfection and excitement and action, states "Yes, it's a sleepy little town". Will it work? Well, this city needs more than a few ads to get rid of that image. It actually needs to evolve. (Oh, the joys of cynicism.)

I think it's a good thing to take pride in your home town. But I really can't stand the people (be they writers in magazines or lifestyle TV presenters) who constantly insist that Brisbane is a "world-class city", featuring the "funky" and "pumping" Fortitude Valley; that "Brisbane is the new black"; that Brisbane is jam-packed with cafés and art galleries; that Brisbane is the "hub of culture" (a grand total of two mainstream cinemas in the CBD, for example); even that Brisbane is the "greatest" city in the world.

Brisbane has a way to go. It's going to take more than a new shopping centre on the corner of Edward and Adelaide (as nice as that may be) to signal Brisbane's "coming of age". Don't get me wrong, Brisbane has some really great areas. But when I see Japanese tourists in town taking photos of the Commonwealth Bank building, I think 'we really have to give them, and ourselves, more'.

Why is it that I can go into the city and see the same stranger three times in the space of an hour? Why can I go into the city on Sunday night and hear my footsteps echoing? Why is a torn singlet, togs, and bare feet perfectly acceptable in Elizabeth Street? Why am I on buses that rattle like buggery? Buses that were built for Expo '88. Buses that were designed when the term 'air-conditioning' sounded like something you would do to improve the health of a plant.

Brisbane is a sleepy little town. I will tear my hair out completely the next time I read an article by someone who likens this city to Paris. Expansion needs to be pursued. Let's stop restricting ourselves to the same old CBD-nucleus that has existed forever. The gap between the city and the Valley should be filled.

_______________________________________________

On another note, "The Weekend" by Michael Gray is good. Really good. Download it if you can.

posted by Anthony Stoddart @ 9:16 AM  

8 Comments:

  • At Fri Aug 05, 05:54:00 PM, Blogger Anthony Stoddart said…

    I'm ecstatic that you get exactly what I'm saying. You're absolutely right.

    And the point you make about STREETS is also exactly what should be done.

    All in all, like you said, alternative options other than the Myer Centre are needed. Desperately.

     

  • At Fri Aug 05, 06:51:00 PM, Anonymous Anonymous said…

    I will get to it Boys, drafts on their way!

     

  • At Sun Aug 07, 11:42:00 AM, Blogger Anthony Stoddart said…

    Thank you... love......

     

  • At Sun Aug 07, 04:47:00 PM, Anonymous Anonymous said…

    You know what they say Ant... "The best thing about Brisbane is the road out of it."

     

  • At Tue Aug 09, 11:28:00 AM, Blogger Anthony Stoddart said…

    Indeed.

     

  • At Sun Sep 18, 01:58:00 PM, Anonymous Anonymous said…

    To some, the title of Michael Levin’s article might indicate (as it did to me), the work of an unashamedly anti-homosexual person. However, from the outset, Levin is right to clarify his intentions and the basis of his argument, neither of which can be fairly labelled as homophobic. The article, which is restricted to focusing on male homosexuals, is an outline of the reasons for Levin’s perception of homosexuality as abnormal, in the sense of its mechanical and prudential wrongfulness. At no point does Levin attempt to argue that homosexuality is morally bad (though he certainly does not hint to any moral goodness in homosexuality). He argues that “the misuse of bodily parts” (251) involved in homosexuality is, prudentially speaking, intrinsically bad (and, thus, abnormal in human beings), resulting in unhappiness for homosexuals. He asserts, with the assistance of some effective examples, that evolution has decreed that a life involving what he believes to be the proper use of organs “is on the whole more enjoyable than a life without” (260). Levin also addresses the question of official policy approaches to homosexuality and, importantly, whether or not homosexuality is genetic, and what differences (if any) it would make to his case if it was. Aided by the use of analogies and carefully-chosen words, he produces a strong case that is significantly challenging to counter-argue. However, the fact that he all but accepts the argument that homosexuality is biological (and thus, not an individual’s choice) places the crux of his overall argument under question. Levin’s idea of what is normal – an idea relating directly to heterosexuality and its history - relies on biology. And yet, his classification of homosexuality as abnormal depends on the same source. The argument that homosexuality is abnormal; unnatural; prudentially bad; a misuse of organs; misfortunate; less enjoyable than heterosexuality; and deprived of the fulfilment of true human desire, contradicts the absolutely vital acknowledgment from Levin that homosexuality is certainly non-hereditary and quite possibly genetic.

    Levin’s first argument in his overall case concerns bodily functioning. In attempting to prove that homosexuality contradicts the sacred purpose of sexual organs, he cites (using the classical analysis that structure S is for function F in organism O) the following definition of what classifies proper use of organs:

    (i) S conduces to F in O,
    (ii) O’s being F is necessary for the maintenance of O or O’s genetic cohort, and
    (iii) (i) and (ii) are part of the causal explanation of the existence of persistence of S in O and members of O’s genetic cohort. (!!!!!)

    Important to note here is Levin’s acknowledgment that “an organism may not be interested in survival, or prosperity, or the prosperity of some genetically defined group that contains the organism” (255). He believes that the above definition “distinguishes what something is for from what something may be used for on some occasion” (256). It is important that Levin has taken this into account and prevented his definition from being too narrow. Later in this first section, Levin writes that “nature is interested in making its creatures like what is (inclusively) good for them” (259). In attempting to demonstrate this, he has earlier used the analogy of teeth. The purpose of teeth is chewing, he argues, and humans will inevitably enjoy using their teeth for that given purpose (256). Connecting teeth (with the purpose of chewing) with the male sexual organ (with the purpose of reproducing, and, thus, favouring survival), he continues:

    “...there seems to be no current benefit associated with the absence of this enjoyment. And here... is why it is advisable to use your organs for what they are for: you will enjoy it.”
    (259)

    My point of contention here relates to the interpretation of enjoyment (which Levin believes is causally linked with his definition of proper organ activity). The notion that heterosexual sexual activity, as a result of heterosexual use of sexual organs, leads to enjoyment and, hence, would be wise to adhere to verges on ignorance. Genuine homosexuals would not enjoy using their sexual organs in the heterosexual way. Rather, the very reasonable and well-supported assumption can be made that what homosexuals do enjoy is the use of their sexual organs in the manner that is directly identifiable with homosexuality. We define a male as a homosexual for the very reason that he finds other men sexually arousing and relationships with men more fulfilling and satisfying than he would ever find relationships with women (Corvino 1997: 143). Indeed, Levin clarifies enjoyment by saying it “can be tightened by appeal to the notion of reinforcement” (260). In this sense, his “general evolutionary hypothesis holds that nature tends to make rewarding behaviour that favors [sic] cohort survival, and to make unrewarding behaviour that does not” (260). From Levin’s position, it follows that any human state that rejects the rewards offered by nature is abnormal. Again, I take issue with this, however I think any further criticism concerning this point should be left until after further outlining of the content of Levin’s paper.

    In the following section, Levin applied his core theories already introduced to homosexuality itself. First and foremost, it leads from Levin’s primary argument – that an organ has a given purpose – that a major function of the penis is to implant semen in the vagina. Of course, this is the procedure that has kept the human race in existence. Nature has made this use of the penis rewarding (261).

    “It is clear enough that any proto-human males who found unrewarding this insertion of penis into vagina have left no descendants. In particular, proto-human males who enjoyed inserting their penises into each others’ anuses have left no descendants. This is why homosexuality is abnormal, and why its abnormality counts prudentially against it. Homosexuality is likely to cause unhappiness because it leaves unfulfilled an innate and innately rewarding desire.”
    (261)

    In clarifying the ‘happiness’ issue, Levin writes that a larger proportion of homosexuals are bound to be unhappy than a corresponding proportion of heterosexuals (intentionally leaving open the possibility of a minority of happy homosexuals who “get away with misusing their bodily parts” (262)).

    Levin remains open to the very real possibility that homosexuality is genetic, but asserts that this does not damage his argument. Indeed, he comes very close to admitting that it is genetic: “...since nobody decides what he is going to find sexually arousing, the moral appraisal of sexual object ‘choice’ is entirely absurd” (264). He writes that this does not, however, excuse homosexuality from closer analysis (264). It is homosexuality’s lack of function that makes it abnormal, he argues. Heterosexuals are able to propagate. Homosexuality carries no such function and, consequently, is unrewarding. Additionally, Levin rejects claims from activists who have put forward the idea that homosexuals, through their non-reproduction, ease the pressure of population growth in an allegedly overpopulated world, and therefore favour human survival. Even if this was the case, Levin argues, it could only have come into the debate recently. This makes it irrelevant when one considers that for many millions of years, and as a consequence of the way the world once was, our organs carried the same specific functions and rewards they do now (265). Whilst a strong counter-objection, it still ignores the important point that if homosexuality is biological (and not hereditary), then it is surely no less natural than heterosexuality and, thus, no less normal. I do not believe that Levin is justified in so strongly relying on the concept of heterosexual reproduction as the basis for defining what is sexually normal.

    At this point, I would like to return to Levin’s point that homosexuality leaves an innate desire unfulfilled and consequently creates unhappiness. I have a serious problem with this line of argument. If sexual preference is something a person does not choose, but rather, simply has as a result of their genetic makeup, then the ‘innate desire’ to which Levin refers is, in a homosexual, non-existent. I ask, how could this ‘desire’ – directly associated with the ends of propagation via heterosexual means – exist in a genuine homosexual to an even miniscule degree? It is far too rash of Levin to imply that the rewards of heterosexual penis usage, namely, the enjoyment gained from vaginal penetration and semen implantation leading to reproduction and propagation, fulfil a desire peculiar to the extremely broad and complex category of human beings. Levin writes that his view that homosexuality is unnatural, “even if it violates no cosmic purpose or such purposes we retrospectively impose on nature” (267), explains the “ubiquitous... [and] universally acknowledged” (268) ‘fact’ that homosexuals are unhappy. Levin cites only Lord Devlin’s views in supporting this (268). In order to solidify his argument, it may have been wiser for Levin to describe homosexuals as ‘less happy than heterosexuals’. Though still up for dispute, it would have at least conveyed that heterosexual happiness is quite possibly heightened by the presence of the option to reproduce. To label the majority of the homosexual population as unhappy is a simplistic claim that lacks weight and cannot be in the least substantially supported by Levin.

     

  • At Sun Sep 18, 03:21:00 PM, Anonymous Anonymous said…

    Levin briefly addresses policy issues in relation to homosexuality. He writes that homosexuality’s intrinsic badness does not exclude it from involvement in societal ethics – rights, responsibilities, etc (274). However, he argues that “if homosexuality is unnatural, legislation which raises the odds that a given child will become homosexual raises the odds that he will be unhappy” (274). He also says that society cannot adjust its laws to become more inclusive and accepting of homosexuality “while remaining neutral” (275) about its value. A new policy granting privileges to homosexuals could only rightly occur if society, through the discovery of “new empirical findings about homosexuality” (275), comes to re-evaluate its view of them (and see them as alright) (275). In effect, Levin is quietly critical of the hypothetical situation in which society, having for so long discriminated against homosexuality for its ‘harmfulness’, suddenly reverses its approach (276). If this were indeed to happen, society would “be deciding that homosexuality is not as bad as it once thought” (276). Levin’s decision to not propose what ‘empirical findings’ might be discovered is, I believe, a decision to disregard the very possibility that society might one day relinquish its historical Judaeo-Christian traditions that have resulted in the prejudiced attitudes towards homosexuals that can still be witnessed. Never to be forgotten is that when society deals with homosexuals, it deals with human beings (Corvino 1997: 246). If, as Levin writes, the duty of society is to protect the happiness of its members (e.g. children against homosexuality), it surely neglects its duty if it chooses to not fully accept and legitimise homosexuality.

     

  • At Mon Sep 19, 12:41:00 PM, Anonymous Anonymous said…

    Anthony Stoddart PHIL2140

    Levin, M. “Why Homosexuality Is Abnormal”, The Monist, vol. 67, no. 2, 1984, pp. 251-83

    An Analysis & Evaluation of Michael Levin’s Why Homosexuality Is Abnormal

    (all page references are to Levin’s paper, unless otherwise indicated)

    To some, the title of Michael Levin’s article might indicate the work of an unashamedly anti-homosexual person. However, from the outset, Levin is right to clarify his intentions and the basis of his argument, neither of which can be fairly described as homophobic. The article, which is restricted to focusing on male homosexuals, is an outline of the reasons for Levin’s perception of homosexuality as abnormal, in the sense of its mechanical and prudential wrongfulness. At no point does Levin attempt to argue that homosexuality is morally bad (though he certainly does not hint to any moral goodness in homosexuality). He argues that “the misuse of bodily parts” (251) involved in homosexuality is, prudentially speaking, intrinsically bad (and, thus, abnormal in human beings), resulting in unhappiness for homosexuals. He asserts, with the assistance of some effective examples, that evolution has decreed that a life involving what he believes to be the proper use of organs “is on the whole more enjoyable than a life without” (260). Levin also addresses the question of official policy approaches to homosexuality and, importantly, whether or not homosexuality is genetic, and what differences (if any) it would make to his case if it was. Aided by the use of analogies, he produces a strong case that is significantly challenging to counter. However, the fact that he all but accepts the argument that homosexuality is biological (and thus, not an individual’s choice) places the crux of his overall argument under serious question. Levin’s idea of what is normal – an idea relating directly to heterosexuality and its history - relies on biology. And yet, his classification of homosexuality as abnormal depends on the same source. The argument that homosexuality is abnormal; unnatural; prudentially bad; a misuse of organs; misfortunate; less enjoyable than heterosexuality; and deprived of the fulfillment of true human desire, contradicts the absolutely vital acknowledgment from Levin that homosexuality is certainly non-hereditary and quite possibly genetic.

    Levin’s first argument in his overall case concerns bodily functioning. In attempting to prove that homosexuality contradicts the sacred purpose of sexual organs, he cites (using the classical analysis that structure S is for function F in organism O) the following definition of what classifies proper use of organs:

    (i) S conduces to F in O,
    (ii) O’s being F is necessary for the maintenance of O or O’s genetic cohort, and
    (iii) (i) and (ii) are part of the causal explanation of the existence of persistence of S in O and members of O’s genetic cohort.
    (Bennett 1976; Levin 1976; Wright 1973, cited in Levin 1984: 256)

    Important to note here is Levin’s acknowledgment that “an organism may not be interested in survival, or prosperity, or the prosperity of some genetically defined group that contains the organism” (255). He believes that the above definition “distinguishes what something is for from what something may be used for on some occasion” (256). It is important that Levin has taken this into account and prevented his definition from being too narrow. Later in this first section, Levin writes that “nature is interested in making its creatures like what is (inclusively) good for them” (259). In attempting to demonstrate this, he earlier uses the analogy of teeth. The purpose of teeth is chewing, he argues, and humans will inevitably enjoy using their teeth for that given purpose (256). Comparing teeth (that have the purpose of chewing) with the male sexual organ (that has the ‘purpose’ of reproducing, and, thus, favouring survival), he continues

    “...there seems to be no current benefit associated with the absence of this enjoyment. And here... is why it is advisable to use your organs for what they are for: you will enjoy it.”
    (259)

    My point of contention here relates to the interpretation of enjoyment (which Levin believes is causally linked with his definition of proper organ activity). The notion that heterosexual sexual activity, as a result of heterosexual use of sexual organs, leads to enjoyment and, hence, would be wise to adhere to verges on ignorance. Genuine homosexuals would not enjoy using their sexual organs in the heterosexual way. Rather, the very reasonable and well-supported assumption can be made that what homosexuals do enjoy is the use of their sexual organs in the manner that is directly identifiable with homosexuality. We define a male as a homosexual for the very reason that he finds other men sexually arousing and relationships with men more fulfilling and satisfying than he would ever find relationships with women (Corvino 1997: 143). Indeed, Levin clarifies enjoyment by saying it “can be tightened by appeal to the notion of reinforcement” (260). In this sense, his “general evolutionary hypothesis holds that nature tends to make rewarding behaviour that favors [sic] cohort survival, and to make unrewarding behaviour that does not” (260). From Levin’s position, it follows that any human state that rejects the rewards offered by nature is abnormal. Again, I take issue with this, however I think any further criticism concerning this point should be left until after further outlining of the content of Levin’s paper.

    In the following section, Levin applies his core theories already introduced to homosexuality itself. First and foremost, it leads from Levin’s primary argument – that an organ has a given purpose – that a major function of the penis is to implant semen in the vagina. Of course, this is the procedure that has kept the human race in existence. Nature has made this use of the penis rewarding (261). He writes

    It is clear enough that any proto-human males who found unrewarding this insertion of penis into vagina have left no descendants. In particular, proto-human males who enjoyed inserting their penises into each others’ anuses have left no descendants. This is why homosexuality is abnormal, and why its abnormality counts prudentially against it. Homosexuality is likely to cause unhappiness because it leaves unfulfilled an innate and innately rewarding desire.
    (261)

    In clarifying the ‘happiness’ question, Levin writes that a larger proportion of homosexuals are bound to be unhappy than a corresponding proportion of heterosexuals (intentionally recognising the possibility of a minority of happy homosexuals who “get away with misusing their bodily parts”) (262).

    Levin remains open to the very real possibility that homosexuality is genetic, but asserts that this does not damage his argument. In fact, he comes very close to admitting that it is genetic: “...since nobody decides what he is going to find sexually arousing, the moral appraisal of sexual object ‘choice’ is entirely absurd” (264). He writes that this does not, however, excuse homosexuality from closer analysis (264). It is homosexuality’s lack of function and purpose that makes it abnormal, he argues. Heterosexuals are able to propagate. Homosexuality carries no such function and, consequently, is unrewarding. Additionally, Levin rejects claims from activists who have put forward the idea that homosexuals, through their non-reproduction, ease the pressure of population growth in an allegedly overpopulated world, and therefore favour human survival. Even if this was the case, Levin argues, it could only have come into the debate recently. This makes it irrelevant when one considers that for many millions of years, and as a consequence of the way the world once was, our organs carried the same specific functions and rewards they do now (265). Though a strong counter-objection, it still ignores the important point that if homosexuality is biological (and not hereditary), then it is surely no less natural than heterosexuality and, thus, no less normal. I do not believe that Levin is justified in so strongly relying on the concept of heterosexual reproduction as the basis for defining what is sexually normal.

    At this point, I would like to return to Levin’s point that homosexuality leaves an innate desire unfulfilled and consequently creates unhappiness. I have a serious problem with this line of argument. If sexual preference is something a person does not choose, but rather, simply has as a result of their genetic makeup, then the ‘innate desire’ to which Levin refers is, in a homosexual, non-existent. How could this ‘desire’ – directly associated with the ends of propagation via heterosexual means – exist in a genuine homosexual to an even miniscule degree? It is far too rash of Levin to imply that the rewards of heterosexual penis usage, namely, the enjoyment gained from vaginal penetration and semen implantation resulting in reproduction, fulfil a desire peculiar to the extremely broad and complex category of human beings. Levin writes that his view that homosexuality is unnatural, “even if it violates no cosmic purpose or such purposes we retrospectively impose on nature” (267), explains the “ubiquitous... [and] universally acknowledged” (268) ‘fact’ that homosexuals are unhappy. Levin cites only Lord Devlin’s views in supporting this (268). In order to solidify his argument, it may have been wiser for Levin to describe homosexuals as ‘less happy than heterosexuals’. Though still up for dispute, it would have at least conveyed that heterosexual happiness is quite possibly heightened by the presence of the option to reproduce. To label the majority of the homosexual population as unhappy is a claim that lacks weight and cannot be in the least substantially supported by Levin.

    Levin briefly addresses policy issues in relation to homosexuality. He writes that homosexuality’s intrinsic badness does not exclude it from involvement in societal ethics – rights, responsibilities, etc (274). However, he argues that “if homosexuality is unnatural, legislation which raises the odds that a given child will become homosexual raises the odds that he will be unhappy” (274). He also says that society cannot adjust its laws to become more inclusive and accepting of homosexuality “while remaining neutral” (275) about its value. A new policy granting privileges to homosexuals could only rightly occur if society, through the discovery of “new empirical findings about homosexuality” (275), comes to re-evaluate its view of them (and see them as alright) (275). In effect, Levin is quietly critical of the hypothetical situation in which society, having for so long discriminated against homosexuality for its ‘harmfulness’, suddenly reverses its approach (276). If this were indeed to happen, society would “be deciding that homosexuality is not as bad as it once thought” (276). Levin’s decision to not propose what ‘empirical findings’ might be discovered is, I believe, a decision to disregard the very possibility that society might one day relinquish its historical Judaeo-Christian traditions that have resulted in the prejudiced attitudes towards homosexuals that can still be seen. Never to be forgotten is that when society deals with homosexuals, it deals with human beings (Corvino 1997: 246). If, as Levin implies, the duty of society is to protect the happiness of its members (e.g. children against homosexuality), then society surely neglects its duty if it chooses to not fully accept and legitimise homosexuality.

    Michael Levin’s paper is successful in the way it asks and attempts to answer important questions that remain relevant today. It is a generally stable article that, as I mentioned, proves a challenge to debate. However, once further analysis of Levin’s views and justifications is complete, it can be seen that they do carry serious flaws that need addressing. As my evaluation repeated, the biological question is probably the most important one. Though Levin denies a genetic connection to homosexuality would significantly impact upon his case, I struggle to see how he could possibly continue to describe a biologically-created human state as both unnatural and abnormal. An ingrained sexual preference cannot be fairly compared to some type of disease. As a result, Levin contradicts himself when he links homosexuality to both abnormality and biology. Similarly, it is wrong of Levin to so confidently describe homosexuals as unhappy, when the alleged source of happiness on which Levin focuses is inextricably linked to heterosexuality. What Levin has demonstrated is the lack of validity that comes with the use of evolutionary arguments when attempting to isolate homosexuality from nature.











    Words: 1, 972




    LIST OF REFERENCES

    Corvino, J. “Homosexuality: The Nature and Harm Arguments” in A. Soble (ed.) The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, 3rd edn, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997, pp. 137-48.


    Corvino, J. “Homosexuality and the Moral Relevance of Experience” in H. La Follette (ed.) Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1997, pp. 241-250.


    Levin, M. “Why Homosexuality Is Abnormal”, The Monist, vol. 67, no. 2, 1984, pp. 251-83.

     

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