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Saturday, October 22, 2005

AFI Movie Quotes

The American Film Institute released what it believed to be the top 100 movie quotes (from U.S. movies) earlier this year. I was recently reading the list with interest. As to be expected, most of the quotes are pre-1980s. A lot of great lines can be found in post-1980 films (some of which are indeed listed), but it seems that most of these sorts of lists are packed with oldies. Which, of course, I have nothing against. The older films were usually more dramatic, and contained very aloof, theatrical dialogue: "What do you take me for? Some jumbo-sized sucker?". Anyway, I've selected seven of my favourites from the AFI top 100. For the complete list, go to http://www.cnn.com/2005/SHOWBIZ/Movies/06/22/film.moviequotes.list.ap/. And tell me what your favourites are, be they from the list or any others.
















"Toto, I've a feeling we're not in Kansas anymore."
- The Wizard of Oz (1939)

"After all, tomorrow is another day!"
- Gone With The Wind (1939)

"Here's lookin' at you, kid."
- Casablanca (1942)

"Here's Johnny!"
- The Shining (1980)

"A census taker once tried to test me. I ate his liver with some fava beans and a nice Chianti."
- The Silence of the Lambs (1991)

Striker: "Surely you can't be serious."
Rumack: "I am serious... And don't call me Shirley."
- Airplane! (1980)

"Listen to me, mister. You're my knight in shining armor. Don't you forget it. You're going to get back on that horse, and I'm going to be right behind you, holding on tight, and away we're gonna go, go, go!"
- On Golden Pond (1981)

posted by Anthony Stoddart @ 7:07 AM  

4 Comments:

  • At Mon Oct 24, 01:22:00 PM, Blogger Anthony Stoddart said…

    Hmmm... No takers?

     

  • At Tue Nov 01, 02:35:00 PM, Anonymous Anonymous said…

    This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.

     

  • At Wed Nov 02, 11:53:00 AM, Blogger Anthony Stoddart said…

    This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.

     

  • At Mon Nov 07, 10:49:00 AM, Blogger Anthony Stoddart said…

    Despite impressions given by the title of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s paper, A Defense of Abortion is not a complete defence. I would not describe it as passionately pro-choice. With the use of good analogies, Thomson argues from a practical perspective as to why abortion is a reasonable option, particularly for women who are raped. The article ends up taking neither a pro-life nor a pro-choice side. Obviously, a paper named A Defense of Abortion is not going to be pro-life, however Thomson, and disappointingly so, stops short of supplying us with a solid reason for why abortion can always be an acceptable option that will not reflect badly on the mother who chooses to have the procedure carried out.

    Thomson introduces her essay by immediately criticising the most common argument used by the ‘pro-life’ side of the abortion debate. Basically, this argument revolves around the idea that a foetus is a person from the moment of conception. As a result of this belief, it follows that abortion is always inexcusable and impermissible. The argument is made, writes Thomson, because it is too difficult to specify a particular moment between conception and birth as the moment that the ‘thing’ becomes a person. Thomson, using the familiar and informal philosophical term, describes the argument as a “slippery slope argument” (69). Despite this, Thomson concedes that “the prospects for ‘drawing a line’ in the development of the fetus [sic] look dim” (69). She writes “I am inclined to think… that we shall probably have to agree that the fetus [sic] has already become a person well before birth” (69).

    For the purpose of the first section of her paper, Thomson grants that a foetus has been a person from the moment of conception. She suggests that, from here, it follows that:

    • every person has a right to life, and that
    • therefore, a foetus has a right to life, and
    • the foetus, as a person, carries a right to life that outweighs a mother’s right to decide what happens in and to her body. (70)

    She admits that, initially, the argument “sounds ‘plausible’” (70). I too believe it sounds extremely plausible and very convincing. It is one of, if not the strongest argument the pro-life activists carry. In responding to (and countering) this argument, Thomson uses the ‘famous unconscious violinist’ analogy.

    In section one, Thomson creates the scenario of a pregnant woman whose life will end if an abortion is not performed: “…suppose a woman becomes pregnant, and now learns that she has a cardiac condition such that she will die if she carries the baby to term” (71). Thomson explains that the most familiar pro-life response to such a scenario is that nothing should be done. Such a decision would not result in the killing of the mother, but rather the less-morally-reprehensible allowance of her death. To perform an abortion in this situation would involve the killing of an innocent child – a child that is clearly not aiming to achieve the mother’s death (71). Thomson then proceeds to provide the varying ways in which this pro-life argument can continue.


    “(1) But as directly killing an innocent person is always and absolutely impermissible, an abortion may not be performed. Or, (2) as directly killing an innocent person is murder, and murder is always and absolutely impermissible, an abortion may not be performed. Or (3) as one's duty to refrain from directly killing an innocent person is more stringent than one's duty to keep a person from dying, an abortion may not be performed. Or, (4) if one's only options are directly killing an innocent person or letting a person die, one must prefer letting the person die, and thus an abortion may not be performed.” (71)



    Each of the proffered premises provides excuses for allowing the mother to die and for saving the unborn child. They take what Thomson describes as the ‘extreme view’, which she defines as “the view that abortion is impermissible even to save the mother’s life” (71). Thomson brands the anti-abortion premises (1), (2), (3) and (4) as “all false” (71), stating


    “…it cannot seriously be thought to be murder if the mother performs an abortion on herself to save her life. It cannot seriously be said that she must refrain, that she must sit passively by and wait for her death.” (71)




    In Thomson’s efforts to disprove and discard the ‘extreme’ pro-life theory that abortion remains unacceptable in the scenario given above (and others like it), she first acknowledges the virtually-inevitable involvement of a third party in such a situation, taking into account the difficulties and dangers of a self-instrumented abortion. She writes that, in this sense, some people will consider the decisions and actions of the third party as more relevant and significant than the mother’s decisions and desired actions (72). She does, however, take issue with this attitude: “…to treat the matter in this way is to refuse to grant to the mother that very status of person which is so firmly insisted on for the fetus [sic]” (72). This is an excellent response. What seems to be all-too-easily forgotten in these sorts of scenarios is the mother’s equal (if not superior) right to life and ‘status of person’. The reason I hint to the possibility that the mother carries a superior right to life over the unborn is that, depending on what stage of the pregnancy the scenario takes place in, it is possible that the unborn exists at a time during which it lacks sentience. I admit, however, to the likeliness that for the unborn to lack this, the pregnancy would have to be in a very early stage. Thomson stops to clarify that she is “not claiming that people have a right to do anything whatever to save their lives” (72). The situation in focus here, she writes, involves two innocent beings, one whose life is threatened and one who threatens it. For this reason, Thomson can understand that a third party might feel extremely reluctant to intervene. The person threatened, however, can intervene and has a right to do so (72):

    “…a woman surely can defend her life against the threat posed to it by the unborn child, even if doing so involves its death. And… [this shows] that the extreme view of abortion is false.” (72)




    Section two is brief, as it suggests that even a weakened version of the extreme view could not be right either. A weakened extreme view would, according to Thomson, say that “while abortion is permissible to save the mother’s life, it may not be performed by a third party, but only by the mother herself” (72). The mother, she writes, owns her body. The mother and the unborn cannot be likened to two tenants in a house (72).

    Section three addresses what it means to have a right to life. We can argue, writes Thomson, that during a pregnancy wherein the mother’s life is not at risk, the child’s right to life holds more weight than any other factor (apart from the mother’s own right to life, “which she might put forward as ground for an abortion”) (73). Responding, Thomson writes that this argument “treats the fight to life as if it were unproblematic. It is not, and this seems to me to be the precise source of the problem” (73). The right to life, she asserts, does not (or rather, should not) provide an assurance to the being concerned that it will possess the right to use another person’s body even if in order to continue its own life and sustain its own survival (74). We, therefore, all carry the right to refuse the use of our bodies for the purpose of protecting another’s.

    In section four, Thomson highlights a pro-life argument that, by the end of the section, she concludes may very well be valid and acceptable (or, at least, unable to be strongly counter-argued). The argument is formed in response to the following scenario: a woman engages in consented sexual intercourse, fully aware that this could result in her impregnation. Soon enough, she does discover that she’s pregnant. The right to life, Thomson writes, lies in the right not to be killed unjustly, as opposed to simply the right not to be killed (an argument that “runs a risk of circularity” (74)). So, in this scenario, whilst the woman certainly did not invite the unborn in, Thomson asks “is she not in part responsible for…[its] presence…[and] existence…?” (74). It is very, very difficult for anyone to deny this. And it indicates to me the importance of the process leading to conception. That lead-up seems to be absolutely vital, and indeed is what determines the two opposing sides that shall emerge if abortion is contemplated. What follows from this situation is the view that, as a result of consented sexual intercourse during which the now-mother was aware and accepting of the possible consequences of that act, the unborn depends on the mother and the mother, in turn, carries a unique responsibility for it (75). This particular argument, writes Thomson, “would give the unborn person a right to its mother’s body only if her pregnancy resulted from a voluntary act, undertaken in full knowledge of the chance a pregnancy might result from it” (75). This would “leave out entirely the unborn person whose existence is due to rape” (75). By accepting this argument – that there are some circumstances in which the unborn has a right to its mother’s body – Thomson accepts that there are some situations in which abortion is unjust killing and, therefore, wrong (as it would violate the right to life) (75). And whilst Thomson nevertheless writes that this “does not establish that all abortion is unjust killing” (75), she does here ultimately imply that abortion cannot always be defended and, thus, the pro-choice camp must be ready to concede their view in some circumstances (that view being that women have a say in what happens in/to their body).

    Section five allows us to consider pregnancy and abortion in surroundings with altered dynamics, ultimately assisting us to broaden the perspective from which we perceive abortion and its subjective rightness or wrongness. Thomson wants to establish her acceptance that there exist some situations in which abortion would be morally indecent, but not necessarily wrong or unjust. She wants the reader to suppose that the pregnancy, rather than lasting nine months, in fact lasts for one hour. Additionally, the pregnant woman in this scenario was raped. It might well be said that the woman “ought to allow” (76) the pregnancy to take its course and for the child to be born. Indeed, Thomson agrees that for an abortion to be carried out on the pregnant woman’s wishes in these circumstances (unrealistic as they may be), she is self-centred and callous. She is not, however, acting unjustly. The creation of this scenario demonstrates that whilst the immediate, superficial reactions to an abortion may alter with a variation in circumstances and surroundings, the ultimate freedom of choice and the right to refuse the attachment of our bodies to others for causes that do not necessarily benefit us (but rather, disadvantage us) must be realised, properly understood and protected. Nobody, according to Thomson, “is morally required to make large sacrifices…in order to keep another person alive” (77). One issue that I think does arise from this viewpoint is how we should define ‘large sacrifice’. Even if a woman’s ‘right to choose’ is established and becomes widely accepted, still present would be the view that, in a situation in which the pregnant woman was not raped, the pregnancy should be seen through. And if the woman has no desire for children, the child can be put up for adoption and granted parents that will care for it and cherish it without the presence of guilt. This view appears slightly conservative and is certainly not one that I steadfastly agree with. However, what Thomson has not done strongly throughout the paper is develop a solid defence of abortion in a non-rape situation.

    Whilst she has argued that the right is carried by women to detach themselves from a being that relies on their very body for life, she has not clarified why abortion should be acceptable or even considered when a pregnancy has occurred out of consented, unprotected sexual intercourse in the age of contraception and sexual freedom. Again, this view could easily sound outdated and overly conservative. And again, it is not one with which I necessarily agree. However, as mentioned, the title of Thomson’s paper, A Defense of Abortion, is slightly misleading in that it is not a complete defence. Indeed, section four does not achieve (or even propose) a counter-argument to the pro-life view. And in concluding her paper, Thomson writes that the article does not argue that abortion is always permissible.

     

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